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Abstract: This paper investigates whether OECD countries compete with each other for 
mobile factors by using various fiscal (tax-spending) policy instruments. We use a panel 
dataset of 20 OECD countries over the 1982-2000 period. There is evidence that international 
capital inflows (FDI) are affected by fiscal policy at home and abroad. Also, there is evidence 
of fiscal competition for mobile factors which takes place via capital tax rates. More 
precisely, we find that domestic capital tax rates react: (i) positively to changes in capital tax 
rates and (ii) negatively to changes in public investment spending in neighbouring countries. 
In contrast, evidence of such a strategic interdependence over public investment spending 
decisions is not established.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Policy interdependence across countries is the cornerstone of recent policy debate 
focusing on fiscal competition among national governments. In the tax competition 
literature, which is the most popular branch of research in this area, national 
governments cut their tax rates in an attempt to attract mobile factors (see e.g. 
Wildasin, 1988; Persson and Tabellini, 1992).1 Similar incentives may be present in 
government spending decisions (see e.g. Keen and Marchand 1997; Bayindir-
Upmann, 1998; Fuest, 1995). In this case, national governments increase some 
categories of spending, like public investment, again in an attempt to attract mobile 
factors.2 All these are examples of non-cooperative, prisoner’s dilemma situations. 
There is empirical support for these predictions.3 Focusing on OECD economies, 
Devereux et al. (2008) provide evidence that countries do choose their tax rates on 
corporate profits in a strategic way. The same result is also shared by Besley et al. 
(2001), who estimate a wide set of tax reaction functions for OECD countries and by 
Cassette and Patty (2008), who investigate potential existence of strategic interactions 
between the former EU15 countries and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
regarding corporate tax rates. Redoano (2007), focusing on a set of fiscal variables 
both on revenue and expenditure sides, concludes that countries interact over capital 
                                                 
1 The possibility that competition across national jurisdictions in order to attract capital results in 
inefficiently low tax rates and public good provision dates back to Oates (1972). However, the 
“benchmark tax competition model” has been first articulated by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and 
Wilson (1986). For surveys on international tax competition literature see Wilson (1999), Wilson and 
Wildasin (2004) and Haufler (2001). 
2 A large branch of fiscal competition literature assumes that governments finance solely a residential 
public good that does not affect capital productivity. In these cases even when international fiscal 
competition takes place via public spending (see e.g. Wildasin 1988) the benchmark results of tax 
competition theory  (i.e. inefficiently low capital tax rates and underprovision of public good) do not 
change. Fuest (1995) and Bayindir-Upmann (1998) suggest that fundamental tax competition results 
(i.e. underprovision of public good) may change crucially when public good is assumed to affect 
directly the productivity of capital. Moreover, when both residential public goods and public inputs are 
provided, non-cooperative fiscal policy leads to a systematic bias toward public inputs (Keen and 
Marchand 1997). 
3 The earliest paper in this literature, the study of Case et al. (1993) estimates a model of strategic 
interaction in expenditures among state government in the U.S. Similar research has been conducted by 
Baicker (2005) who replicated Case et al. (1993) results by carrying out a similar exercise with 
different econometric techniques and Murdoch et al. (1993) who estimate a model based on city-level 
spillovers in recreation expenditures using municipal data. On the taxation side, most of the existing 
empirical works on reaction function has employed local level data and examine within country 
strategic interdependence –due to tax competition -among states or provinces. Brueckner and Saavedra 
(2001), Brett and Pinkse (1997, 2000) estimate tax reaction functions focusing on properties taxes for 
cities in the Boston metropolitan area and Canada respectively. Other empirical studies that rely on tax 
competition theory are Hayashi and Boadway (2001) focused on provincial corporate income taxes on 
Canada and Buettner (2001) which carry out a similar exercise using local business tax in Germany. 
Finally, Pitlik (2007) examines international policy diffusion as a potential source of policy 
liberalization among OECD economies by employing identical empirical methodology.  
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tax rates as well as over some categories of public spending (e.g. general public 
services and education spending).   
The present paper contributes to this literature in two ways. First, apart from 
estimating solely fiscal policy reaction functions we proceed by estimating a foreign 
direct investment (FDI) inflows equation. This gives us the opportunity to examine 
directly whether fiscal policy choices home and abroad affect domestic capital 
inflows and moreover, to illuminate the sign of potential fiscal policy externalities 
among OECD economies. Second, we study strategic fiscal policy interdependence 
across national borders by examining not only whether domestic capital tax rates 
(resp. public investment spending) react to changes in capital tax rates (resp. public 
investment spending) in neighbouring economies but in addition whether capital tax 
rates (resp. public investment) react to changes in public investment spending (resp. 
capital tax rates) abroad. In this way, we place the spotlight on an important issue not 
previously examined by the relevant literature. This is the potential strategic 
substitution between capital tax rates and public investment spending.4 Our dataset 
consists of a panel of 20 OECD countries over the period 1982-2000. 
Our main empirical findings are as follows. First, we confirm the existence of 
fiscal policy spillovers among OECD countries. Specifically, we verify that FDI 
inflows in a country are: (i) negatively related to the difference between domestic 
capital tax rates and foreign capital tax rates and (ii) positively related to the 
difference between domestic public investment spending and foreign public 
investment spending.5 Second, we show that domestic capital tax rates react positively 
to changes in capital tax rates in neighbouring economies.6 Third, we empirically 
evidence that domestic capital tax rates react negatively to changes in public 
investment spending abroad. Fourth, no empirical evidence of strategic 
interdependence over public investment spending decisions is established.  
                                                 
4 To our knowledge this is the first study that examines cross instruments strategic interdependence. 
Previous studies are either focused strictly on tax reactions functions (see e.g. Devereux et al., 2008; 
Cassette and Paty, 2008) or estimate tax and government spending reaction functions (e.g. Case et al., 
1993; Redoano, 2007) without however examining cross instrument fiscal competition.  
5 Our results are consistent with previous empirical studies examining the effect of tax rates on 
international capital allocation (see e.g. Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2005a; de Mooij and Ederveen 2003; 
Devereux and Griffith 2003). Concerning the effect of government spending on FDIs, our results are 
consistent with Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2005b) who argue that particular categories of public spending 
(such as Infrastructure Spending, Research and Development and Health) do affect international capital 
location decision. 
6 Our findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions of fiscal competition theory (e.g. Wildasin, 
1988; Keen and Marchand, 1997) and the empirical findings of previous studies on OECD economies 
(e.g. Devereux et al., 2008; Cassette and Paty, 2008; Besley et al., 2001). 
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The structure of the paper is as follows; in the next section, we present a 
theoretical framework; in section 3, we discuss the empirical specification and some 
econometric issues; in section 4, we discuss the data; in section 5 we present the 
empirical results. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Setup 
 
In this section we describe a standard “resource flow” model (see Brueckner, 2003). 
Jurisdiction i cares about capital resides within its borders. Because the international 
distribution of this resource among jurisdictions depends on the fiscal policy choices 
of all, jurisdiction i is then indirectly affected by fiscal policy abroad.  
International capital inflows in country i are given by: 
 
( , ; )                              ,       1, 2,....                                        (1)it it jt itK K P P X i j j n= ≠ =
 
where itK  is international capital inflows in country i, itP  is fiscal policy instruments 
(taxes or spending) in country i and jtP  is fiscal policy instruments in foreign 
countries. Finally, itX  is a vector of socio-economic characteristics of country i. 
National government in country i decides itP  in order to maximize the welfare of 
the representative agent by taking equation (1) into account and jtP  as given. This, 
yield a fiscal policy reaction function that describes country i’s best response to fiscal 
policy choices abroad. This can be written as: 
 
( ; )                                       ,       1, 2,....                                     (2)it jt itP R P X i j j n= ≠ =  
 
Empirical works on strategic interaction (i.e. Devereux et al., 2006, 2008; 
Brueckner, 2003; Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001) focus on estimating the slope of the 
reaction function. Finding a non zero, statistically significant, estimated slope imply 
existence of strategic behavior among jurisdictions. In addition, an upward (resp. 
downward) sloping reaction function indicates that fiscal policy instruments itP and 
jtP  are strategic complements (resp. substitutes).
7 
                                                 
7 In games with two players, each with only one strategic variable, it is well known that the two 
variables being strategic complements (resp. substitutes) is equivalent to positively sloped (resp. 
negatively sloped) reaction functions (see e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) 
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In the presence of spillovers among jurisdictions non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium is inefficient since it fails to maximize social welfare. However, equation 
(2) gives no information about the sign of fiscal policy spillovers and consequently 
about the direction of the inefficiency (i.e. whether non cooperative (Nash) fiscal 
policy choices are inefficiently low or inefficiently high).8 Apart from that, verifying 
existence of strategic behavior among jurisdictions does not illuminate the source of 
interdependence and leaves room to totally different theoretical explanations.9  
In this paper apart from estimating fiscal policy reaction function we proceed by 
additionally estimate equation (1). This gives us the opportunity to examine directly 
whether fiscal policy choices home and abroad affect domestic capital inflows and 
moreover, to illuminate the sign of fiscal policy externalities. Finding a positive (resp. 
negative), statistically significant, relation between jtP  and itK  implies existence of 
positive (negative) fiscal policy spillovers among regions.10  
 
3. Empirical Specification 
 
3.1 Empirical specification of the capital inflow equation 
Equation (1) implies that international capital inflows in country i, depend on fiscal 
policy chosen at home ( itP ) and abroad ( jtP ) as well as country i’s characteristics, 
represented by a vector itX . In order to obtain a measure of fiscal policy chosen 
abroad ( jtP ), we follow the existing literature (see e.g. Devereux et al., 2006, 2008; 
Brueckner, 2003) and assume that jtP  is a weighted average of fiscal policy chosen in 
foreign countries. Thus, we have:  
 
                                                 
8  The standard game theoretic result for symmetric equilibria is that in the presence of positive (resp. 
negative) externalities, players strategies, are inefficiently low (resp. high) in a Nash equilibrium 
relative to a cooperative one (see Cooper and John, 1988; Philippopoulos and Economides, 2003). 
9 Although much of the empirical literature concludes that OECD countries do affect each other on the 
tax setting, the source of interdependence remains yet highly controversial. This is because fiscal 
strategic interaction among countries may be due to reasons other than tax competition for mobile 
factors. A widespread alternative theoretical explanation of the detected strategic interaction is the 
theory of yardstick competition (see e.g. Shleifer, 1985; Salmon, 1987; Besley and Case, 1995). 
According to this theory citizens compare public services and taxes across jurisdictions in order to 
judge whether their own political representatives waste resources and deserve to be voted out of office. 
In the presence of such comparisons, policy makers decide their own fiscal policy by “mimicking” the 
corresponding fiscal policy in neighbouring economies. 
10 Note the underlying assumption that welfare of the representative agent residing in country i is 
positively dependent on Kit.  
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           and              1jt ij jt ij
j i j i
P w P w
≠ ≠
≡ =∑ ∑   
where ijw  represent nonnegative weights a priori specified. These weights are 
inversely related to the geographical distance between i and j jurisdiction and capture 
the relative geographical proximity among two economies (for details, see Appendix 
A).11 In principle, we would like the weights to be large (resp. small) when two states 
are close (resp. away) from each other.  
Assuming that equation (1) is linear and following the relevant empirical 
literature (i.e. Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2005a; de Mooij and Ederveen, 2003) which 
suggests that international capital inflows in a country depend on the difference 
between itP and jtP , we estimate the following equation:  
1 1( )                                                                        (3)it it jt it i t itK a P P X f uθ λ= − + + + +  
where 1a  and 1θ are coefficients (theta is vector), if  is country i’s specific fixed 
effects, tλ  is country i’s specific time effect and itu  is an error term. A positive (resp. 
negative) 1a  indicates existence of positive (resp. negative) fiscal policy spillovers.  
 
3.2  Empirical specification of the policy reaction functions 
Equation (2) implies that fiscal policy in country i ( itP ) depends on country i’s socio-
economic characteristics, represented by a vector itX , and fiscal policy chosen abroad 
( jtP ). However, equation (2) cannot be estimated as it stands. Although in principle 
each country could respond differently to the fiscal choices of each other country, this 
leads to a large number of parameters that cannot be estimated due to lack of degrees 
of freedom. We follow the relevant literature (see e.g. Devereux et al., 2006, 2008; 
Brueckner, 2003; Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001) and assume that each country i 
responds in the same way to the weighted average of fiscal choices of other countries. 
                                                 
11 The methodology we follow in order to construct ijw  is identical to that followed by other empirical 
studies (see e.g. Devereux et al., 2008; Brueckner, 2003; Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001).  
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This allows us to employ the same weighted average measure ( jtP ), discussed in the 
previous section.  
Assuming that reactions functions are linear and allowing for country specific 
fixed effects and time trends (as in Devereux et al., 2008), the associated estimating 
equation can be written as: 
 
1 2                                                                                      (4)it jt it i it itP P X f t uβ θ= + + + +
 
 
where 1β  and 2θ  are coefficients (theta is vector), if  is country i’s specific fixed 
effect, itt  country i’s specific time trend and itu  is the error term. Finding a non-zero 
and statistically significant 1β  provides evidence of strategic interaction among 
regions in fiscal policy instruments.  
 
3.3 Econometric issues related to the estimation of reaction functions.  
Because of possible strategic interactions, fiscal policy instruments in different 
jurisdictions are jointly determined. As a result, the jtP  appearing on the right hand 
side of (4) is endogenous and correlated with the error term itu . This correlation 
means that OLS estimators of (4) are inconsistent, requiring the use of an alternative 
estimation method. 
We follow the relevant literature (see e.g. Devereux et al., 2006; 2008) and 
employ an instrumental variable (IV) approach to address this. For each element of 
itX , denoted by itx , we construct a weighted average of other countries’ 
corresponded elements: jt ij jt
j i
x w x
≠
=∑  and regress jtP  on jtX . Then, as a second 
stage, we regress the predicted variables of jtP  on itP . Tables report the regression 
results of the second stage. 
A second issue is that in practice, government spending and taxation are serially 
correlated, perhaps because changes in fiscal policy may have costs of adjustment on 
the private sector or because such changes may have political cost and tend to be 
blocked by interest groups. There may also be spatial correlation in the error terms. 
Spatial error dependence arises when the error term itu  includes omitted variables that 
are themselves spatially dependent. To deal with the problem of spatial dependence 
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we employ the IV estimation method.12 In addition, we present t-statistics based on 
clustered standard errors which are robust to both spatial and serial correlation (see 
e.g. Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004) 
A third issue is that while we would like to include time dummies in order to 
capture the shocks in each period which are common to all countries, this is not 
generally feasible. To see this, consider the case of uniform weights. Then (4) can be 
written as an equation where itP  depends on the average of all countries’ fiscal 
choices 1
n
jt
j
t
P
P
n
==
∑
plus itX . The effect of tP  has no cross country variation and 
cannot be identified separately from a time dummy. However, we do allow for 
unobserved factors varying over time as far as possible by including country specific 
time trends. We also include country specific fixed effects.  
 
4. Data 
Our dataset consists of 20 OECD countries for the 1982-2000 period.13 In Tables 1 
and 2, we employ as dependent variable the Foreign Direct Investment inwards as a 
share of GDP (denoted as FDI). Data for FDI are obtained from United Nation 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Foreign Direct Investment 
Database. 
In Table 1, we estimate equation (3) by focusing on international capital tax 
rates and examining how the latter affect Foreign Direct Investment allocation. 
Hence, in this case, the fiscal policy instruments, itP  and jtP , take the form of capital 
tax rates home and abroad respectively. More precisely, FDI is regressed on capital 
tax rate differences between home and abroad ( tcap retcap− and tcorp retcorp− ) as 
well as on a set of control variables.14 
In order to capture the tax burden on capital, we employ two alternative 
effective tax rate measures constructed by Adam and Kammas (2007) based on the 
                                                 
12 It has been demonstrated that IV yields consistent estimations even in the presence of spatial error 
dependence (see Kelejian and Prucha, 1998). 
13 The countries in our sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
UK, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland and USA. 
14 The weighted average of capital tax rates in neighbouring countries retcorp  and retcap are 
constructed as suggested by Devereux et al. (2008) and Brueckner (2003). For more details on this see 
section 3.1 
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methodology developed by Mendoza et al. (1994).15 Specifically, we employ: (i) the 
effective tax rate on corporate profits (denoted as tcorp) which takes into account 
exclusively the tax burden fallen on corporate profits and (ii) the effective tax rate on 
capital income (denoted as tcap) which can be viewed as a more general measure of 
the tax burden on capital.16 
The other control variables are the standard variables used in the empirical 
literature on FDIs (see e.g. Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2005a; Devereux and Griffith, 
1998). FDI stock (denoted as FDIstock) is the value of foreign direct investment 
established in the host as a share of the domestic GDP; unit labor costs (unlab) 
comprise wages, salaries and social security contributions paid by the employer per 
unit of output; government spending (govspend) is total government spending as a 
share of GDP; and productivity of labor (prod) is the output per unit of labour input. 
Finally, market potential (markpot) is measured as a ratio of GDP per capita in the 
host country to its internal geographical area (for more details on data see Appendix 
B).  
In all the regressions, we include two-way error component fixed effects to 
account for country- specific and time- specific, unobservable factors. 
In Table 2, we estimate equation (3) by focusing on public investment spending 
and examining how the latter influences international capital allocation. Hence, in this 
case, fiscal policy instruments itP  and jtP  take the form of public investment spending 
at home and abroad respectively. More precisely, in Table 2, FDI is regressed on 
public investment spending differences between home and abroad 
( 1 1publinv republinv−  and 2 2publinv republinv− ), as well as on the above described 
set of explanatory variables.17,18 
                                                 
15 The simple measures of statutory tax rates cannot capture the complexity of the tax system nor 
provide a clear indicator of the implied tax policy. Since the overall tax burden does not depend solely 
on the statutory tax rates, but also on what is defined - by the tax legislation - as the tax base, we are in 
need of some more complicated tax measures that take into account changes in the tax base (e.g. 
changes in allowances or deductions). The approach of calculating effective average tax ratios, based 
on the Mendoza et al. (1994) approach, basically consists of defining the tax rate as a ratio of the tax 
revenues from a particular tax base to the corresponding tax base (for a critical comparison of 
alternative effective tax rate methodologies, see e.g. Volkerink and de Haan, 2001) 
16 For more details on the methodology developed by Mendoza et al. (1994) see Appendix A. 
17 The weighted average of public investment spending in neighbouring countries 1republinv  and 
2republinv are constructed as suggested by Devereux et al. (2008) and Brueckner (2003). For more 
details on this see section 3.1 
18 In Table 2 the variable govspend is replaced by the statutory capital tax rate (denoted as statcorp). 
This is because in Table 2 our main controls of interest (i.e. publinv1 and publinv2) are government 
spending measures and thus we are in need of some tax rate measure. Data for statcorp are obtained 
from the World Tax Database from the Office of Tax Policy Research (OTPR) at the University of 
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In order to capture public investment spending, we employ two alternative 
measures. The first one (denoted as publinv1) comprises the summation of the 
“Transport and Communications” and the “General Public Services” accounts 
whereas the second one (denoted as publinv2) comprises exclusively the “Transport 
and Communications” account. All data required to construct these variables are taken 
from the IMF Government Financial Statistics (GFS) dataset. 
Finally, we include country and time dummies in our regressions to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity and common time effects.  
In Tables 3 to 5, we proceed by estimating equation (4) (i.e. fiscal policy 
reaction function). More precisely, in Tables 3 we interchangeably employ as 
dependent variable tcap and tcorp and we then estimate two alternative reaction 
functions of capital tax rates. To capture the reaction of domestic capital tax rates to 
capital tax rates abroad, we follow the existing literature (see e.g. Devereux et al., 
2008; Brueckner, 2003) by regressing the predicted values of retcap and retcorp  
(taken from the first step of the IV method as described in section 3.3) on domestic 
tax rates tcap and tcorp correspondingly.  
Our empirical specification follows Devereux et al., (2008) (hereafter denoted as 
DLR (2008)). In particular, we employ as control variables the DLR (2008) set of tax 
rate determinants. Thus, we employ the proportion of population below 14 years old 
(denoted as young), the proportion of population above 65 years old (old); the 
proportion of population living in urban areas (urban); public consumption as a share 
of GDP; market openness to trade (openness) and the relative size of each economy 
(relsize).19 Moreover, we employ the cabinet ideology measure developed by Cusack 
(1997) (denoted as gov) in order to control for partisan effects on the tax setting (see 
e.g. Winer and Hettich, 2003; Reed, 2006). This measure locates government 
ideology on a min-max range with higher values denoting more extreme right-wing 
government. Finally, we include country-specific dummies and country-specific time 
trends in our regression to control for unobserved heterogeneity and allow for 
unobserved factors to vary over time as far as possible.20  
                                                                                                                                            
Michigan. OTPR provides extensive tax data compiled from various sources (Price Waterhouse 
Coopers, Corporate Taxes Worldwide Summaries and Individual Income: Worldwide Summaries and 
World Bank’s Development Indicators). 
19 Relsize is measured as the ratio of domestic GDP to the GDP in USA. Fore more details on relsize 
see Appendix A and DLR (2008)  
20 Ideally we would like to include time dummies to capture shocks in each period that are common to 
all countries but this is not generally feasible (See section 3.3 and DLR (2008), footnote 35,  pp.1224 
on this issue). 
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In Table 4, we proceed by estimating again capital tax rates’ reaction functions. 
Thus, we employ again as dependent variables tcap and tcorp. However, in this case 
we extend our set of controls by additionally including two alternative measures of 
public investment spending in neighboring countries (i.e. 1republinv  and 
2republinv ). This allows us to investigate the crucial issue of potential strategic 
substitution between capital tax rates and public investment spending (i.e. whether 
domestic capital tax rates also react to changes in public investment spending abroad). 
Our empirical specification is the identical to that employed in Table 3. 
In Table 5, we proceed by estimating public investment spending reaction 
function. In this case, we interchangeably employ as dependent variable 1publinv  
and 2publinv .  
To examine whether public investment spending at home reacts to changes in 
public investment spending abroad we regress the predicted values of 1republinv  and 
2republinv  (obtained from the first step of IV method as described in section 3.3) on 
1publinv  and 2publinv  correspondingly. Additionally, we regress retcap and 
retcorp  on 1publinv  and 2publinv  in order to examine whether domestic public 
investment also reacts to changes in capital tax rates abroad. 
Our core set of control variables is based on the studies of Case et al. (1993) 
(hereafter denoted as CHR (1993)) and Rodrik (1998). Hence, we employ the 
proportion of population below 14 years old (young); the proportion of population 
above 65 years old (old); the population density (dens); the fraction of population 
living in urban areas (urban); GDP per capita (gdppercap);  the market openness to 
international trade (openness). Moreover, we employ the cabinet ideology measure 
constructed by Cusack (1997) (denoted as gov) in order to control for potential 
partisan effects on fiscal spending (see e.g. Perotti and Kontopoulos, 2002; Van Dalen 
and Swank, 1996) and an ethnic tension index (denoted as ethnic) in order to control 
for the effects of ethnic heterogeneity on government spending (see e.g. Easterly and 
Levine, 1997; Alesina and Glaeser, 2004). 21 As before, in all regressions, we include 
country-specific dummies and country specific time trends to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity and allow for unobserved factors to vary over time 
 
                                                 
21 Lower ratings are given to countries where racial and nationality tensions are high because opposing 
groups are intolerant and unwilling to compromise. Higher ratings are given to countries where 
tensions are minimal, even though such differences may still exist (for details see ICRG, 2006) 
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5. Results  
In the following subsections we discuss the results obtained by working as above. 
These are reported in Tables 1 to 5.  
 
5.1 Testing the effect of capital tax rates on Foreign Direct Investment  
We start by testing the FDI equations (3) presented in section 3.1, using the data and 
the empirical methodology outlined in the previous section. The results are reported in 
Table 1.  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
In columns 1 to 5, FDI is regressed on the difference between domestic capital tax 
rates and foreign capital tax rates ( tcap retcap− ) as well as on a standard set of 
control variables (i.e. unlab, prod, FDIstock, govspend and markpot ) in a two-way 
error component fixed effect specification. As can be seen, the coefficient on capital 
tax rate differences ( tcap retcap− ) appears to be negative and highly significant in 
most of the estimations which implies that FDI inwards are affected negatively (resp. 
positively) by increases in domestic (resp. foreign) capital tax rates.  
As far as the rest of the explanatory variables are concerned, we observe that all 
of them bear the expected –by the theory-sign. FDIstock and prod enter with positive 
and significant coefficients, indicating the positive effect of established FDI and 
increased labor’s productivity to the FDI inflows in a country. On the other hand, 
unlab, markpot and govspend appear to be non significant in all the alternative 
specifications. 
In Columns 6 to 10, we estimate equation (3) by employing the effective tax rate 
on corporate profits (tcorp) as alternative proxy of capital tax burden. Hence, in this 
case, FDI is regressed on the difference between domestic corporate profits tax rates 
and foreign corporate tax rate ( tcorp retcorp− ) whereas the empirical specification 
and the set of control variables remain unchanged. As can be seen, our results remain 
qualitative intact. Capital tax rate difference ( tcorp retcorp− ) enter with a negative 
and statistically significant coefficient while the coefficients on FDIstock and prod 
stay positive and highly significant in all the specifications. A worth noting point is 
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that, in this case, unlab bears a negative and statistically significant coefficient 
implying that FDI inwards are affected negatively by increases in unit labor cost. 
Summarizing the main messages of Table 1, we conclude that FDI inflows are 
negatively (resp. positively) affected by increases in domestic (resp. foreign) capital 
tax rates. Our results provide empirical support for the existence of positive tax policy 
spillovers among OECD countries.  
 
5.2 Testing the effect of public investment on Foreign Direct Investment  
In Table 2 we test the FDI equation (3) presented in section 3.1 by employing the data 
and the empirical methodology outlined in the previous section. In this case, the fiscal 
policy instrument under examination is public investment spending. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
 In columns 1 to 5, FDI is regressed on the difference between domestic public 
investment spending and public investment spending in neighboring economies 
( 1 1publinv republinv− ) and on the standard set of explanatory variables in a two-way 
error component fixed effect specification.22 
As can be seen the difference ( 1 1publinv republinv− ) bears a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient in all the alternative specifications which implies that FDI 
inwards are affected positively (resp. negatively) by increases in domestic (resp. 
foreign) public investment spending.  
Concerning the rest of the control variables, our results remain qualitative 
similar to those presented in Table 1. FDIstock and prod enter with positive and 
significant coefficients whereas the coefficient on statcorp appears to be negative and 
statistically significant. The only worth noting difference is that, in this empirical 
specification, the coefficient on markpot becomes significant at a level of 99 percent. 
The positive effect of markpot on FDI inwards highlights the fact that richer and –
geographically- smaller economies tend to attract more Foreign Direct Investments. 
In columns 6 to 10, we estimate equations (3) by employing 2publinv  as 
alternative measure of public investment spending. As can be verified, our main 
results remain qualitative the same. Namely, public investment spending difference 
                                                 
22 As we have already mentioned, in Table 2, the core set of explanatory variables remain identical to 
that of Table 1. The only difference is that in Table 2 we have replaced the govspend variable with 
statutory tax rate (denoted as statcorp). For more details on this see Section 4 and footnote 15. 
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( 2 2publinv republinv− ) bear positive and statistically significant coefficients in most 
of the estimations whereas the coefficients on the rest of the explanatory variables 
remain qualitative intact.  
The overall message delivered by Table 2 could be described as follows. FDI 
inflows are positively (resp. negatively) affected by increases in domestic (resp. 
foreign) public investment spending which implies negative public investment 
spending spillovers among OECD economies.  
 
5.3 Testing strategic interaction in capital tax rates 
In Table 3, we report results from the estimation of fiscal policy reaction function (4) 
when the key fiscal policy instrument under examination is capital tax rates. More 
precisely, in columns 1 to 6, tcap  is regressed on the predicted values of retcap  and 
the core set of control variables (i.e old, young, urban, openness, relsize, pcons and 
gov) following the empirical method described in section 3.3.  
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
As can be seen, the coefficient on retcap  appears to be positive and statistically 
significant at a level of 99 percent which implies that domestic capital tax rates do 
react positively to changes in capital tax rates in neighbouring economies.This result, 
remains highly robust through all the alternative specifications providing sound 
evidence of strategic interdependence in capital tax policy setting across OECD 
economies.23  
As far as the rest of the explanatory variables are concerned, our empirical 
findings appear to be consistent with our theoretical priors as well as the findings of 
previous empirical studies. In particular, the coefficients on old and pcons are positive 
and significant, indicating that economies with larger proportion of old population and 
larger public sectors tend to have increased fiscal needs which in turn may increase 
capital tax rates. On the other hand, the coefficients on openness and gov bear 
negative signs and appear to be highly significant in most of the presented 
estimations. These results are in accordance with our theoretical priors that more open 
economies tend to rely less on the taxation of mobile factors of production (see e.g. 
                                                 
23 It must be noted that our findings are in line with the findings of previous empirical studies referred 
to OECD countries (see e.g. Devereux et al., 2008; Besley et al., 2001). 
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Bucovetsky and Wilson, 1991) as well as that left-wing governments rely heavier on 
capital taxation (see e.g. Reed, 2006; Bretschger and Hettich, 2002). Moreover, 
relsize enters with a negative and significant coefficient highlighting that larger 
economies tend to sustain lower capital tax rates. This result could be attributed to the 
economies of scale in public good provision of large economies (see e.g. Alesina and 
Wacziarg, 1997) which in turn implies lower tax burdens. Finally, young appears to 
be insignificant in most of the presented estimations.  
In columns 7 to 12, we employ the effective tax rate on corporate profits (tcorp) 
as a measure of capital tax rates and re-estimate reaction function (4).Hence, tcorp is 
now regressed on the predicted values of retcorp whereas the empirical specification 
and the set of control variables remains unchanged. As can be verified, the coefficient 
on retcorp bears a positive and significant sign at a level of 99 percent in all 
alternative estimations. This result is consistent with our previous findings and 
provides additional evidence of strategic interdependence in capital tax setting among 
OECD countries. As far as the control variables are concerned, our results remain 
qualitative intact. 
 
5.4  Strategic substitution between capital tax rates and public investment spending 
In Table 4, we report results from the estimation of tax policy reaction function (4) 
when we additionally introduce public investment spending in neighboring economies 
1republinv  and 2republinv  as explanatory variable. In this way, we place the spotlight 
on an important issue not previously examined by the relevant empirical literature. 
This is, the potential strategic substitution between capital tax rates and public 
investment spending (i.e. whether domestic capital tax rates also react to public 
investment spending abroad). Providing the fact that international capital location is 
affected by both capital tax rates and public investment spending (see Tables 1 and 2 
for empirical evidence on this), national governments may choose their tax policy 
rates by taking into account not only the capital tax rates but in addition the public 
input spending in neighbor economies.  
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
Hence, in columns 1 to 6, tcap  is regressed on the predicted values of retcap , 
the standard set of control variables and additionally on 1republinv  and 2republinv . 
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As can be seen, the coefficients on 1republinv  and 2republinv  are negative and 
significant at the level of 99 percent in most of the presented regressions. This implies 
that governments do take into consideration public input spending abroad, when they 
decide domestic capital tax rates. Given that increases on public investment spending 
in neighbor economies motivate capital flights away from the domestic economy, 
national government react by reducing domestic capital tax rates.  
As can be identified, the negative relationship between capital tax rates and 
public investment spending remains highly robust also in the case where we employ 
as dependent variable the effective tax rate on corporate profits (tcorp) (columns 7 to 
12). As far as the rest of the explanatory variables are concerned, our results remain 
qualitative similar to those reported in Table 3.  
 
5.5 Testing strategic interaction in  public investment spending 
In Table 5, we report results from the estimation of fiscal policy reaction function 
when the key fiscal policy instrument under examination is public investment 
spending. More precisely, in columns 1 to 6, 1publinv  is regressed on the predicted 
values of 1republinv  and on a core set of control variables (i.e old, young, ethnic, 
openness, urban, density, gdppercap, and gov) following the empirical method 
described in section 3.3.24 Moreover, in some regressions we additionally introduce in 
the set of the controls the retcorp  variable and the retcap  in order to capture potential 
strategic substitution between public investment spending and capital tax rates.  
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
As can be seen, in most of the regressions, the coefficient on 1republinv  appears 
to be non significant which implies that domestic public investment spending do not 
seems to react to changes in public investment spending in neighbouring economies.  
As far as the rest of the explanatory variables are concerned, the coefficient on 
ethnic is positive and significant in most of the regressions indicating that higher 
                                                 
24 Our set of controls consist of standard variables employed in estimation where total government 
spending enters as dependent variable (see e.g. CHR 1993; Rodrik, 1998). However, it must be stressed 
that since in our case the dependent variable is not total government spending but a sub-account of it 
(namely public input spending) there are no clear cut theoretical priors concerning the effects of our 
controls. 
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ethnic homogeneity increases public input government spending.25  On the other 
hand, the coefficient on gov is negative and significant at a level of 99 percent in all 
alternative estimation. This result implies that left-wing governments tend to increase 
public input government spending. Finally openness, urban, old and density appear to 
be non significant in most of the presented estimations whereas the coefficient on 
young and gdppercap bears negative and significant signs. 
In columns 7 to 12, we employ as dependent variable the alternative measure of 
public investment spending, 2publinv . Thus, 2publinv  is regressed on the predicted 
values of 2republinv  and on a set of control following the empirical method 
described in section 3.3. Moreover, in some regressions we additionally introduce in 
the set of the controls the retcorp  variable and the retcap  in order to capture potential 
strategic substitution between public investment spending and capital tax rates. 
 As can be identified, the coefficient on 2republinv  appears to be non 
significant which provides additional evidence that domestic public input spending do 
not react to changes in public input spending in neighbouring economies.  As far as 
the rest of the explanatory variables are concerned, our results remain qualitative 
similar to those reported in Columns 1 to 6.  
 
6. Conclusions 
We examined whether OECD countries compete with each other for mobile factors by 
using various fiscal (tax-spending) policy instruments. Our dataset consists of a panel 
of 20 OECD countries over the period 1982-2000. 
Our results suggest that international capital inflows (FDI) are affected by fiscal 
policy at home and abroad. More precisely, there is evidence that international capital 
inflows (FDI) are negatively (resp. positively) related to capital tax rates (resp. public 
investment spending) differentials among OECD countries. 
Moreover, we show that OECD economies compete via capital tax rates for 
mobile factors. More precisely, we find that domestic capital tax rates react not only 
to changes in capital tax rates (as in Devereux et al., 2008; Cassette and Paty, 2008; 
Besley et al., 2001) but also to changes in public investment spending in neighbouring 
countries. In this way we provide empirical evidence of strategic substitution between 
capital tax rates and public investment spending. 
                                                 
25 Easterly and Levine (1997) and Alesina and Glaeser (2004) obtain similar results when they examine 
the effect of ethnic homogeneity on general government spending.  
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Appendix A: Variables and Data Sources 
 
Effective Tax Rates  
The methodology of effective taxation basically consists of defining the tax rate as a 
ratio between the tax revenues from particular taxes and the corresponding tax base. 
In this paper, we employ data on: (i) the effective tax rate on corporate profits (tcorp) 
and (ii) the effective tax rate on capital income (tcap) constructed by Adam and 
Kammas (2007) based on the methodology developed by Mendoza et al. (1994) .  
More precisely, based on Mendoza et al. (1994) the tax ratio on corporate profits 
(tcorp) is defined as the fraction of taxes on income, profits and capital gains of 
corporations (1200), to the operating surplus of the economy (OS) minus the 
operating surplus of private unincorporated enterprises (OSPUE). Moreover, the 
capital income tax ratio (tcap) is defined as the product of personal income tax ratio 
(tper) and the sum of the operating surplus of private unincorporated enterprises 
(OSPUE) plus taxes on income, profits and capital gains of corporations (1200) plus 
taxes on property (4100), and taxes on financial and capital transaction (4400) over 
the operating surplus of the economy (OS).  
 
Weights in more details  
There are several ways in which a state can assumed to be neighbour of another state. 
In this paper, we assume that neighbouring is dependent on the geographical 
proximity between two states. Hence, we construct a weighting matrix that assigns 
higher values to states geographically close. More in detail: 
1 1A
ij
jij ij
w
d d
= ∑ where 
ijw is the ij element of the weighted matrix
dW and ijd  is the geographical distance 
between the capital of state i and state j. Data on geographical distance among two 
states are taken from CEPII Geodesic Distance Dataset (2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Description Obs. Mean Std.Dev. min max Sources 
tcap 
Effective Average 
Tax Rate (EATR) 
of capital 
334 27.796 13.530 0.140 62.590 
 
Adam and Kammas (2007) 
data based on the 
methodology developed by 
Mendoza et al. (1994) 
tcorp 
Effective Average 
Tax Rate (EATR) 
of corporate 
profits 
315 20.642 14.268 0.070 75.230 
Adam and Kammas (2007) 
data based on the 
methodology developed by 
Mendoza et al. (1994) 
statcorp Top corporate 
income tax rate 
380 36.913 9.293 9.800 56.000 
World Tax Database, Office 
of Tax Policy and Research, 
University of Michigan 
publinv1 
Transports, 
Communications 
and General 
Public Services as 
a share of GDP 
282 3.607 1.608 1.400 10.000 
Author’s  Calculations based 
data taken from IMF, 
Government Finance 
Statistics Database (2002) 
publinv2 
Transports and 
Communications 
as a share of GDP 
282 1.539 1.023 0.200 5.900 
Data taken from IMF, 
Government Finance 
Statistics Database (2002) 
govspend 
Total Public 
Spending as a 
share of GDP 
370 36.703 8.859 19.200 55.800 World Bank Development 
Indicators (2004) 
FDI 
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
Inwards as a share 
of GDP 
342 1.842 3.152 -1.000 28.000 
United Nation Conference on 
Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) Foreign Direct 
Investment Database 
FDIstock 
Foreign Direct 
Investment Stock 
as a share of GDP 
342 17.982 22.941 2.000 166.000 
United Nation Conference on 
Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) Foreign Direct 
Investment Database 
markpot 
GDP per capita to 
internal 
geographical area 
380 0.968 3.315 0.002 21.798 
GDP per capita (constant 
1995 US$) is taken from 
WBDI (2004). Internal  
geographical area is obtained 
from CEPII distance database 
(2004) 
prod Productivity of 
Labour 
380 85.588 9.762 53.690 100.000 OECD Economic Outlook 
Dataset (2005a) 
unlab Unit Labour Costs 372 80.201 18.354 10.540 100.820 OECD Economic Outlook Dataset (2005a) 
openness 
Sum of Imports 
and Exports as a 
share of GDP 
380 73.783 42.929 17.300 226.100 World Bank Development 
Indicators (2004) 
old 
Proportion of 
population above 
65 years old 
380 14.087 1.897 9.700 18.070 World Bank Development 
Indicators (2004) 
young 
Proportion of 
population below 
14 years old 
380 19.323 2.655 14.300 30.000 World Bank Development 
Indicators (2004) 
urban 
Proportion of 
population living 
in urban areas 
380 74.763 12.802 32.500 97.300 World Bank Development 
Indicators (2004) 
gov 
Government 
cabinet gravity 
indicator. 
347 2.946 0.743 2.000 4.000 Cusack (1997) 
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gdppercap 
GDP per capita 
(constant 1995 
US$) 
380 24074.77 9039.28 7329.00 56372.00 World Bank Development 
Indicators (2004) 
ethnic Ethnic Tension 
Index 
318 5.216 0.919 1.000 6.000 
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) database 
(2006) 
pcons 
Public 
Consumption as a 
share of GDP 
361 21.764 4.180 13.9 32.9 OECD National Accounts 
Database (2005b) 
relsize 
Relative size of 
each country 
measured as 
domestic GDP to 
the GDP of the 
US economy 
380 10.913 21.583 0.00 100.00 
GDP Data are obtained from 
World Bank Development 
Indicators (2004) 
dens 
Population 
Density (people 
per sq km) 
361 121.145 114.980 1.980 469.860 World Bank Development 
Indicators (2004) 
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 Table 1: The effect of Capital Taxation on FDI Inwards 
 
 (Notes:  t-statistics are shown in the parentheses below the estimated coefficients *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1%.) 
Dependent Variable: FDI inwards (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
tcap - retcap  -0.043* (-1.77) 
-0.043* 
(-1.80) 
-0.050** 
(-2.12) 
-0.058** 
(-2.33) 
-0.074*** 
(-3.39)      
tcorp - retcorp       -0.028* (-1.73) 
-0.028* 
(-1.73) 
-0.029* 
(-1.82) 
-0.038** 
(-2.28) 
-0.033** 
(-2.34) 
FDIstock 0.373*** ( 10.21) 
0.374*** 
(11.05) 
0.359*** 
(10.00) 
0.380*** 
( 10.03) 
0.278*** 
(10.98) 
0.382*** 
(10.10) 
0.386*** 
(11.08) 
0.362*** 
(9.80) 
0.385*** 
(9.80) 
0.352*** 
(12.52) 
unlab -0.027 (-1.36) 
-0.028 
(-1.43)  
-0.023 
(-1.10) 
0.014 
(0.91) 
-0.039* 
(-1.67) 
-0.042* 
(-1.88)  
-0.024 
(-0.99) 
-0.048** 
(-2.38) 
govspend 3.983 ( 0.88) 
3.964 
(0.88) 
0.142 
(0.04) 
6.445 
(1.39)  
5.012 
(1.09) 
4.932 
(1.08) 
0 .921 
(0.22 
7.562 
( 1.60)  
prod 0.139*** (4.09) 
0.139*** 
(4.18) 
0.154*** 
(4.88)  
0.070** 
(2.27) 
0.147*** 
(4.11) 
0.146*** 
(4.12) 
0.158*** 
(4.83)  
0.125*** 
(3.82) 
markpot 0.277 (0.087)  
0.660 
( 0.15) 
-3.516 
(-0.74) 
6.867 
(1.59) 
1.257 
(0.27)  
2.558 
(0.59) 
-1.340 
(-0.27) 
3.262 
(0.74) 
2R  0.77 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.71 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.73 0.74 
Observations 242 242 245 242 307 234 234 237 234 288 
No of countries 16 16 16 16 17 15 15 15 15 16 
Table 2: The effect of Public Investment Spending on FDI Inwards 
 
 
 (Notes:  t-statistics are shown in the parentheses below the estimated coefficients *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1%.) 
Dependent Variable: FDI inwards (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
1 1publinv republinv−  0.383** (2.15) 0.468** (2.58) 0.372** (2.13) 0.308* (1.66) 0.393** ( 2.19)      
2 2publinv republinv−       0.638** (2.11) 0.786** (2.55) 0.597** (2.02) 0.402 (1.28) 0.620** (2.03) 
FDIstock 0.040*** (3.95) 
0.034*** 
(3.27) 
0.040*** 
(3.95) 
0.021** 
(2.12) 
0.042*** 
(4.07) 
0.043*** 
(4.22) 
0.037*** 
(3.58) 
0.042*** 
(4.18) 
0.022** 
(2.31) 
0.045*** 
(4.35) 
unlab -0.011 (-0.51) 
-0.037* 
(-1.74)  
-0.006 
(-0.26) 
-0.010 
(-0.49) 
-0.015 
(-0.72) 
-0.043** 
(-2.02)  
-0.009 
(-0.39) 
-0.015 
(-0.69) 
statcorp -0.047** (-2.31) 
-0.049** 
(-2.35) 
-0.049** 
(-2.49) 
-0.056*** 
(-2.64)  
-0.049** 
(-2.41) 
-0.052** 
(-2.47) 
-0.051** 
(-2.58) 
-0.058*** 
(-2.71)  
prod 0.179*** (4.84) 
0.165*** 
(4.36) 
0.184*** 
(5.26)  
0.187*** 
(5.03) 
0.184*** 
(4.94) 
0.171*** 
(4.49) 
0.188*** 
(4.16)  
0.192*** 
(5.12) 
markpot 17.025*** (3.68)  
17.231*** 
(4.06) 
14.706*** 
(3.04) 
17.337*** 
(3.71) 
17.005*** 
(3.67)  
17.564*** 
(4.16) 
14.884*** 
(3.07) 
17.401*** 
(3.72) 
2R  0.64 0.62 0.64 0.60 0.63 0.64 0.62 0.64 0.60 0.63 
Observations 258 258 261 258 258 258 258 261 258 258 
No of countries 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
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Table 3: Capital tax rates strategic interaction 
 
 
(Notes:  t-statistics are shown in the parentheses below the estimated coefficients.*,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1%.) 
 
 
 tcap  tcorp  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
retcap  2.090*** 
(4.24) 
2.331*** 
(4.22) 
2.727*** 
(3.27) 
1.879*** 
(4.20) 
1.824*** 
(4.86) 
2.568*** 
(3.50)       
retcorp        2.252*** (5.21) 
2.493*** 
(5.22) 
3.125*** 
(4.38) 
2.094*** 
(5.00) 
2.191*** 
(5.06) 
2.434*** 
(3.62) 
old 2.594*** (3.24)  
1.836* 
(1.89) 
2.743*** 
(4.40) 
3.023*** 
(3.84) 
2.491** 
(2.85) 
4.163** 
(2.86)  
2.376 
(1.35) 
2.707* 
(1.91) 
4.636*** 
(3.37) 
5.230*** 
(3.69) 
young -0.493 (-0.65) 
-1.228 
(-1.57) 
-0.998 
(-1.08) 
-0.283 
(-0.47) 
-1.454* 
(-2.06)  
-1.937 
(-1.41) 
-3.166** 
(-2.27) 
-3.528** 
(-2.15) 
-2.366** 
(-2.18) 
-3.293** 
(-2.51)  
urban 4.778*** (3.41) 
4.792*** 
(3.35)  
0.996* 
(1.83) 
3.930*** 
(3.70) 
5.051*** 
(3.46) 
7.337*** 
(5.51) 
7.033*** 
(4.98)  
1.412** 
(2.34) 
6.550*** 
(5.08) 
7.708*** 
(5.33) 
openness -0.162*** (-4.49) 
-0.150*** 
(-4.06) 
-0.138*** 
(-3.85) 
-0.175*** 
(-4.84) 
-0.116*** 
(-3.63) 
-0.197*** 
(-4.47) 
-0.186** 
(-2.66) 
-0.189** 
(-2.81) 
-0.206** 
(-2.64) 
-0.167** 
(-2.74) 
-0.163** 
(-2.86) 
-0.262*** 
(-3.19) 
relsize  -0.285*** (-3.37) 
-0.272*** 
(-3.10) 
-0.225** 
(-2.28) 
-0.313*** 
(-3.69) 
-0.205*** 
(-3.02) 
-0.279** 
(-2.54) 
-0.122 
(-0.86) 
-0.121 
(-0.75) 
-0.025 
(-0.16) 
-0.133 
(-1.04) 
-0.049 
(-0.40) 
-0.138 
(-0.78) 
pcons 0.868*** (3.60) 
1.040*** 
(4.28) 
0.767*** 
(3.94)  
0.919*** 
(-3.02) 
0.838*** 
(3.27) 
0.827*** 
(3.04) 
0.979*** 
(3.63) 
0.631** 
(2.23)  
0.980*** 
(3.54) 
0.606*** 
(2.91) 
gov -0.764** (-1.98) 
-0.927*** 
(-2.41) 
-0.821** 
(-2.08) 
-0.709** 
(-2.15)  
-0.811* 
(-1.95) 
-1.492** 
(-2.48) 
-1.547** 
(-2.38) 
-1.430** 
(-2.21) 
-1.413** 
(-2.43)  
-1.553** 
(-2.46) 
2R  0.94 0.94 0.93 0.85 0.94 0.93 0.88 0.88 0.85 0.89 0.88 0.88 
Observations 301 301 301 320 315 301 282 282 282 301 286 282 
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Table 4: Strategic substitution between capital tax rates and public investment spending 
 
 (Notes:  t-statistics are shown in the parentheses below the estimated coefficients.*,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1%.) 
 tcap  tcorp  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
retcap  0.858)*** 
(2.93) 
1.087*** 
(3.37) 
1.390*** 
(4.78) 
1.481*** 
(4.90) 
0.744** 
(2.62) 
1.026*** 
(3.44)       
retcorp        1.114*** (3.59) 
1.440*** 
(4.44) 
1.049*** 
(3.76) 
1.265*** 
(4.56) 
1.575*** 
(4.66) 
1.829*** 
(5.00) 
1republinv  -2.949*** (-4.00)  
-1.321** 
(-2.27)  
-2.650*** 
(-3.40)  
-3.168*** 
(-3.97)  
-2.460*** 
(-3.42)  
-1.580** 
(-2.17)  
2republinv   -5.698*** (-3.68)  
-2.737** 
(-2.27)  
-4.655*** 
(-3.21)  
-5.302*** 
(-3.77)  
-4.383*** 
(-3.23)  
-1.945* 
(-1.73) 
old 3.629*** (5.57) 
3.622*** 
(5.35) 
2.655** 
( 3.99) 
2.677*** 
(3.93) 
3.748*** 
(5.94) 
3.698*** 
(5.60) 
5.703*** 
(4.39) 
5.489*** 
(3.99) 
5.389*** 
(4.02) 
5.299*** 
(3.77) 
5.283*** 
(4.36) 
5.074*** 
(3.95) 
young 0.431 (0.57) 
0.549 
(0.69) 
-1.009 
(-1.72) 
-0.909 
(-1.49) 
-0.737 
(-1.23) 
-0.736 
(-1.12) 
0.045 
(0.03) 
-0.246 
(-0.18) 
-0.844 
(-0.70) 
-0.958 
(-0.76) 
-2.441* 
(-2.04) 
-2.716** 
(-2.19) 
urban 5.183*** (4.49) 
5.292*** 
(4.27) 
4.053*** 
(2.99) 
4.146*** 
(2.96) 
4.368*** 
(4.73) 
4.406*** 
(4.45) 
8.092*** 
(6.02) 
8.069*** 
(5.77) 
7.131*** 
(5.21) 
7.176*** 
(5.02) 
6.878*** 
(5.37) 
6.788*** 
(5.22) 
openness -0.249*** (-5.83) 
-0.233*** 
(-5.35)   
-0.182*** 
(-6.36) 
-0.162*** 
(-5.34) 
-0.215*** 
(-3.11) 
-0.205*** 
(-2.95)   
-0.159*** 
(-2.97) 
-0.155** 
(-2.90) 
relsize  -0.265** (-2.71) 
-0.335*** 
(-3.36) 
-0.011 
(-0.14) 
-0.050 
(-0.61) 
-0.166 
(-1.88) 
-0.225** 
(-2.70) 
-0.122 
(-0.85) 
-0.184 
(-1.24) 
0.107 
(0.74) 
0.047 
(0.32) 
-0.023 
(-0.18) 
-0.057 
(-0.44) 
pcons 0.932*** (3.82) 
-0.335*** 
(-3.36) 
1.186*** 
(4.45) 
1.196*** 
(4.51) 
1.013*** 
(4.33) 
1.023*** 
(4.48) 
0.923*** 
(3.26) 
0.936*** 
(3.41) 
1.155*** 
(3.53) 
1.160*** 
(3.63) 
1.062*** 
(3.53) 
1.033*** 
(3.48) 
gov -0.772** (-2.35) 
-0.830** 
(-2.29) 
-0.751** 
(-2.23) 
-0.781** 
(-2.19)   
-1.542*** 
(-3.05) 
-1.583 
(-2.93) 
-1.537*** 
(-3.10) 
-1.573*** 
(-3.04)   
2R  0.95 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.91 0.90 0.89 
Observations 301 301 301 301 315 315 282 282 282 282 296 296 
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Table 5: Public investment spending strategic interaction 
(Notes:  t-statistics are shown in the parentheses below the estimated coefficients.*,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1%
 1publinv  2publinv  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
1republinv  0.085 (1.30) 
0.122 
(1.53) 
0.128* 
(1.94) 
0.042 
(0.74) 
0.053 
(0.75) 
0.068 
(1.10)       
2republinv        0.099 ( 1.71) 
0.105 
(1.16) 
0.107 
(1.62) 
0.079 
(1.71) 
0.026 
(0.44) 
0.058 
( 1.11) 
retcorp   0.011 (0.72)   
-0.001 
(-0.08)   
-0.001 
(-0.01)   
-0.013 
(-1.43)  
retcap    0.035** (2.39)   
0.021* 
(1.88)   
0.001 
(0.20)   
-0.010 
(-1.38) 
old -0.178 (-1.17) 
-0.177 
(-1.18) 
-0.212 
(-1.35)    
-0.109 
(-0.99) 
-0.108 
(-0.98) 
-0.110 
(-0.99)    
young -0.151** (-2.38) 
-0.163** 
(-2.60) 
-0.168** 
(-2.52)    
-0.130*** 
(-3.94) 
-0.130*** 
(-3.84) 
-0.131*** 
(-3.85)    
ethnic 0.079* ( 1.93) 
0.076* 
(1.83) 
0.080* 
( 1.92)    
0.027 
(1.16) 
0.027 
(1.14) 
0.027 
(1.14)    
openness 0.004 (0.92) 
0.004 
(0.88) 
0.005 
(1.15)    
0.001 
(0.46) 
0.001 
(0.52) 
0.001 
(0.49)    
urban -0.054 (-1.02) 
-0.055 
(-1.05) 
-0.047 
(-0.93) 
-0.039 
(-0.94) 
-0.039 
(-0.95) 
-0.031 
(-0.74) 
-0.088*** 
(-3.26) 
-0.088*** 
(-3.22) 
-0.088*** 
(-3.22) 
-0.069** 
(-2.50) 
-0.070** 
(-2.77) 
-0.073** 
(-2.77) 
dens 0.041 (1.56) 
0.036 
(1.31) 
0.041 
( 1.54) 
0.021 
(1.11) 
0.021 
(0.96) 
0.020 
(0.98) 
0.044*** 
(3.59) 
0.044*** 
(3.34) 
0.044*** 
(3.56) 
0.018 
(1.51) 
0.025* 
(2.05) 
0.019 
(1.61) 
gdppercap -0.001** (-2.84) 
-0.001** 
(-2.90) 
-0.001** 
(-3.04) 
-0.001*** 
(-2.30) 
-0.001** 
(-2.23) 
-0.001** 
(-2.36) 
-0.001*** 
(-5.95) 
-0.001*** 
(-5.89) 
-0.001*** 
(-5.93) 
-0.001*** 
(-4.79) 
-0.001*** 
(-4.60) 
-0.001*** 
(-4.66) 
gov -0.118*** (-3.73) 
-0.120*** 
(-3.92) 
-0.124*** 
(-3.99) 
-0.116*** 
(-3.72) 
-0.116*** 
(-3.85) 
-0.120*** 
(-3.95) 
-0.046*** 
(-3.00) 
-0.046** 
(-2.89) 
-0.047** 
(-2.94) 
-0.044** 
(-2.23) 
-0.041** 
(-2.17) 
-0.042** 
(-2.16) 
2R  0.94 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
Observations 246 246 246 263 263 263 246 246 246 263 263 263 
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